The Sifting Trend of Digital Defense: From Traditional Encryption Keys to the Molecules of Life (DNA)

Credit: Sora

 "Everything can be intercepted, everything is vulnerable"

Context

When ARPA (now DARPA) Dave Retz issued the above warning years after architecting the Packet Radio integration that helped birth the Internet, few imagined our genetic code could become a vector for cyberattacks. Yet, in today’s next-generation sequencing (NGS) era, researchers have demonstrated how carefully synthesized DNA strands can carry malicious software payloads, slipping past bioinformatics filters and compromising laboratory computers at the base-calling stage. As the cyber-biosecurity arms race intensifies [1], the frontier of digital defense is shifting from traditional firewalls and encryption keys to the fundamental molecules of life. You can likely imagine the consequences, as multiple signals suggest military applications. We will specifically show this in part two of the article.

This escalating threat landscape within biosecurity reflects broader, systemic issues in cybersecurity. Indeed, if early warnings like Dave Retz’s hold true, the current environment lends credence to claims explored by Nicole Perlroth in her book This is How They Tell Me the World Ends [3]. Perlroth chronicles the burgeoning black market for software vulnerabilities (zero-day exploits) and the complex, often detrimental role governments play in fostering this ecosystem for espionage rather than disclosing flaws. This escalating global cyberweapons arms race, described by Perlroth and other researchers [2], inevitably increases the risk across all digital frontiers, making specialized fields such as genomics increasingly attractive targets for civil and military sectors.

Against this backdrop, this article explores the emerging threat vectors specifically within the NGS workflow, from physical sample tampering to DNA-encoded malware. We analyze why safeguarding our genomes has become as critical as securing traditional cyberspace. To this end, we primarily rely on and summarize the core arguments and supporting points of the paper “Cyber-Biosecurity Challenges in Next-Generation Sequencing: A Comprehensive Analysis of Emerging Threat Vectors”. Following the summary, we outline additional studies examining related threat vectors and mitigation tactics in NGS pipelines. Ultimately, we trace the growing investors’ interests in the biohacking market and the startup companies that can counter the threat.

Threat Landscape Backdrop

The general cyber threat landscape, characterized by sophisticated attacks, highlights vulnerabilities that could be mirrored or adapted within genomic research settings. Multiple indications suggest this possibility. For example:

• Cyber Espionage: High-stakes data is a prime target, as seen when hackers spied on emails of 103 US bank regulators (April 2025), accessing sensitive financial institution data for over a year. Genomic data represents similarly high-value information but broader implications.

• Exploiting Software Vulnerabilities: The theft of $1.5 billion in Ethereum from ByBit exploited a third-party wallet vulnerability. 

• Similarly, CloudSEK noted a suspected zero-day or misconfiguration leveraged in an Oracle cloud breach. NGS pipelines rely on complex software stacks that potentially harbor analogous flaws.

• Compromising Credentials: Leaked chat logs from the Black Basta ransomware group revealed automated brute-force/credential stuffing attacks to guess weak and reused passwords on VPNs and firewalls. 

• Furthermore, phishing and poor passwords remain dominant vectors, accounting for a large percentage (e.g., 74% in some reports) of breaches. Human error and credential theft are universal risks applicable to lab environments.

These examples demonstrate typical attack methodologies: espionage, software exploits, and credential compromise. Based on the summarized research, this article will elaborate on analogous vulnerabilities within the complex NGS workflow, potentially allowing attackers to steal sensitive genomic data, manipulate research outcomes, or disrupt critical biomedical infrastructure.

Image of Rossotti’s, one of the birthplaces of the Internet. Photograph: Courtesy of the Alpine Inn Beer Garden, formerly Rossotti’s via The Guardian

The emerging cyber warfare: DNA hacking

The paper “Cyber-Biosecurity Challenges in Next-Generation Sequencing: A Comprehensive Analysis of Emerging Threat Vectors” makes the case that while next-generation sequencing (NGS) has revolutionized genomics by making large-scale DNA and RNA sequencing fast and affordable, it has also opened novel vectors for cyber-biological attacks that have so far been under-examined. Its central arguments are:

NGS’s Transformative Power and New Attack Surface

• Revolution in Genomics: NGS has enabled high-throughput sequencing across healthcare, agriculture, forensics, and beyond, driving personalized medicine and large-scale population genomics.

• Explosion of Sensitive Data: By 2025, an estimated 60 million genomes will have been sequenced globally, vastly increasing the volume of sensitive genetic information at risk 

Fragmented Existing Research on Cyber-Biosecurity

• Most prior studies focus narrowly (e.g., on microbial sequencing or individual software tools) and fail to provide an end-to-end view of vulnerabilities across the entire NGS workflow.

• There is a pronounced lack of interdisciplinary collaboration between genomic scientists, bioinformaticians, and cybersecurity experts, leaving many threat vectors—and appropriate defenses—unaddressed.

The Need for a Structured NGS-Specific Threat Taxonomy

• Traditional cybersecurity frameworks (e.g., MITRE ATT&CK, STRIDE) address network and software vulnerabilities but do not capture biologically-mediated attacks such as DNA-encoded malware or genomic inference attacks.

• The authors introduce a four-stage NGS workflow taxonomy (Raw Data Generation → Quality Control → Bioinformatics Analysis → Interpretation) and systematically map specific threat vectors, ranging from physical sample theft to side-channel attacks on base-calling software.

Identification of Novel Threat Vectors

• DNA-Encoded Malware: Demonstrated feasibility of encoding malicious payloads in synthetic DNA that, once sequenced, can exploit software vulnerabilities on the host system.

• Genomic Inference & Re-identification Attacks: Even limited sequence data (e.g., STR markers or disease-related genes) can be linked to public databases to re-identify individuals or infer sensitive health traits.

• Supply-Chain and Firmware Attacks: If malicious code is introduced upstream, the firmware of sequencing instruments and lab automation systems represents a critical supply-chain vulnerability.

Actionable Mitigation Strategies

• It proposes bio-cybersecurity best practices, such as fragile watermarking of sequence data, AI-enhanced anomaly detection in sequencing pipelines, secure encryption of raw and intermediate files, and tighter physical and network access controls.

• Calls for interdisciplinary research consortia and policy frameworks to ensure that genomic data are ethically handled and technically safeguarded against emerging threats.

Other Studies 

Using Deep Learning to Detect Digitally Encoded DNA Triggers for Trojan Malware

Islam et al. demonstrate a proof-of-concept in which synthetic DNA is deliberately encoded with a malware “trigger.” They then apply a convolutional neural-network classifier to detect and flag such malicious inserts during the base-calling phase, achieving near-100 % detection accuracy even when steganographic techniques are used to mimic genuine genomic sequences.

Computer Security, Privacy, and DNA Sequencing (USENIX Security 17)

Ney et al. present one of the earliest systematic examinations of how executable instruction sequences can be encoded in DNA, exploiting buffer-overflow vulnerabilities in sequencing software. They map out challenges, such as homopolymer runs, and propose synthesis- and software-side defenses to harden base-callers against code injection.  

A Review of Threat Vectors for DNA Sequencing Pipelines

An undergraduate research survey from Old Dominion University catalogs threats spanning sample acquisition, library prep, instrument firmware, bioinformatics tools, and data storage. It reinforces the need for a holistic, end-to-end taxonomy, much like the main paper of this article, while emphasizing input-control checks and secure configuration management.

Cyberbiosecurity: Advancements in DNA-based Information Security

A ScienceDirect review by Anjum et al. lays a theoretical foundation for the emerging field of cyber-biosecurity. It examines DNA steganography, DNA as a storage medium, and the intersection of cryptographic techniques with synthetic biology. Though broader than NGS alone, it offers valuable strategic insights into protecting physical samples and downstream data workflows.

Genetic Similarity of Biological Samples to Counter Biohacking of NGS Pipelines

O’Shaughnessy et al. propose an “input-control” framework that leverages sequence similarity metrics to detect anomalous synthetic constructs before they enter the sequencer. Their lab experiments with E. coli plasmids show how deviation from expected genomic backgrounds can be flagged as potential attack vectors.

Investment Trends in Biohacking and Security

The global biohacking market is projected to expand significantly, with estimates suggesting it could reach USD 115.76 billion by 2033. This growth signals a robust investment landscape, as investors see commercial potential and the critical need to secure biohacking advancements. Funding is flowing into startups that tackle biohacking threats in two main areas: consumer-facing biohacking technologies (like wearables and nutritional products) and cybersecurity solutions tailored to biotechnology.

Notable Startups and Funding Examples

Several startups have successfully secured funding to address biohacking-related challenges:

• Quantum Xchange: This company focuses on advanced encryption to protect data against quantum computing threats, a growing concern in biotechnology and healthcare. It has attracted investment due to the need for secure communication in sensitive biohacking applications.

• Cybereason: A cybersecurity firm specializing in endpoint protection, Cybereason has raised substantial funds from investors like Softbank and Lockheed Martin. Its solutions help safeguard critical systems, including those in biotech labs vulnerable to biohacking threats.

• Kriptos and Elevate Security: These startups develop tools to protect sensitive data and train employees against cyber threats, key issues in biotech firms dealing with genomic data and intellectual property. Their funding reflects the rising demand for insider threat mitigation in the sector.

Beyond cybersecurity, consumer biohacking startups also intersect with security concerns as their technologies become more advanced:

• Thync Global, Soylent, and Pavlok: These companies have raised millions to develop wearables, nutritional products, and behavior-modification tools. While primarily consumer-focused, their innovations raise security questions about data privacy and biological manipulation, drawing investor interest in opportunity and risk management.

Investor Ecosystem

The funding ecosystem for biohacking startups is diverse:

• Venture Capital: Firms invest heavily in biohacking and biotech security, driven by market growth and the strategic importance of safeguarding biological innovations.

• Angel Investors: Platforms like AngelList list over 35 biohacking startups and 565 angel investors interested in the space, showcasing a vibrant community of early-stage funding.

• Government and Private Initiatives: The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in biotech, prompting increased government and private investment in startups that protect research and infrastructure from cyber espionage and insider threats.

Why Investors Are Interested

Investors are motivated by the convergence of biohacking’s potential and its risks. The rise of genomic data, biotech research, and DIY biohacking tools has heightened the need for security solutions. Biotechnology is increasingly viewed as critical national infrastructure, making it a priority for funding to counter threats like data breaches or malicious biohacking. This has led to a surge in investment in startups that can innovate and protect in this space.

Risks to a Future “Biologically Augmented Warriors”

Enhancing human physical abilities for military applications—often referred to as “biologically augmented warriors”—poses significant risks if these augmentation methods are compromised by biohacking. The US and China are researching this area, which we will delve into in our next article.

Ultimately

In an era where “everything can be intercepted, everything is vulnerable,” the genomic domain has emerged as a critical battleground in the escalating cyber-biosecurity arms race. Next-generation sequencing (NGS) has transformed genomics, driving breakthroughs in healthcare, agriculture, and forensics by enabling rapid, large-scale sequencing of DNA and RNA. Yet, as Dave Retz’s prescient warning and Nicole Perlroth’s exploration of the cyberweapons black market suggest, this revolution comes with a cost: our genetic code has become a vector for unprecedented cyberattacks. From DNA-encoded malware that hijacks laboratory systems to genomic inference attacks that expose sensitive personal data, the vulnerabilities within NGS workflows are as diverse as they are dire. The paper Cyber-Biosecurity Challenges in Next-Generation Sequencing: A Comprehensive Analysis of Emerging Threat Vectors lays bare these risks, offering a structured taxonomy of threats—from physical sample tampering to supply-chain compromises—and proposing vital mitigation strategies. Supporting studies, such as those demonstrating deep learning detection of malicious DNA triggers and input-control frameworks to thwart biohacking, reinforce the urgency of this call to action.

The stakes could not be higher. By 2025, an estimated 60 million genomes will have been sequenced globally, creating a treasure trove of sensitive data ripe for exploitation. Left unaddressed, these vulnerabilities threaten the theft or manipulation of genetic information and the disruption of critical research and infrastructure. Beyond the lab, the specter of biohacking looms large, potentially compromising biologically augmented warriors and reshaping the future of warfare, a topic warranting further exploration. The consequences of inaction are profound: eroded trust in genomic technologies, compromised national security, and a setback to the promise of personalized medicine.

To confront this new frontier, we must act decisively. Safeguarding our genomes demands interdisciplinary collaboration—uniting genomic scientists, bioinformaticians, and cybersecurity experts to forge robust defenses. Secure technologies, such as AI-driven anomaly detection and encrypted data workflows, must be paired with stringent physical and network controls. Policymakers and industry leaders must champion international cooperation and comprehensive frameworks to address the global nature of these threats. As the lines between digital and biological security blur, the imperative is clear: we must invest in the tools, talent, and policies needed to protect the very essence of life itself. The future of genomic innovation—and our strength against those exploiting it—depends on it.

Notes:

1. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of an interdependent network of information systems infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

2. Based on the arguments of authors and researchers like Kim Zetter, Fred Kaplan, Andy Greenberg, Bruce Schneier, Charlie Miller, David Sanger, Richard Clarke, P.W. Singer, Mikko Hypponen, and George Lucas ( not the filmmaker), it’s possible to infer whether the cyber arms race could lead to something equivalent to an apocalypse. An “apocalypse” here is understood as a catastrophic event causing widespread destruction or the collapse of civilization. 

3. Retz’s quote is from Perlroth’s book in the epilogue section.

4. OAuth 2.0 is an open standard for authorization that allows users to grant an application access to their data on a server (e.g., Google Drive, Twitter) without sharing their password. It enables third-party applications to access user data securely by delegating authentication to the service provider. 

References:

Crowther, G. A. (2017). The Cyber Domain. The Cyber Defense Review, 2(3), 63–78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26267386.

Grand View Research. (2024). Biohacking market size and share | Industry report, 2030. Retrieved May 3, 2025, from https://www.grandviewresearch.com

• This report offers a detailed analysis of the biohacking market, including market size and share projections extending to 2030, making it a key resource for investment insights.

Emergen Research. (2024, April 10). Top 10 companies in biohacking market in 2024 shaping global industry trends. Retrieved May 3, 2025, from https://www.emergenresearch.com

• This source emphasizes the leading companies propelling the biohacking industry in 2024, offering a glimpse of potential investment opportunities.

Grand View Research. (2024). North America biohacking market size & outlook, 2030. Retrieved May 3, 2025, from https://www.grandviewresearch.com

• This report focuses on the North American market and includes revenue projections and growth rates, providing a regional perspective on biohacking investments.

The Business Research Company. (2024, December 31). Biohacking market report 2025 - Biohacking market trends and forecast. Retrieved May 3, 2025, from https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com

• This forecast report offers trends and insights into the biohacking market through 2025, which are relevant for near-term investment planning.

Market Research Future. (2024). Biohacking market size, growth, trends report 2032 | MRFR. Retrieved May 3, 2025, from https://www.marketresearchfuture.com

• This comprehensive analysis of the biohacking market, including growth rates and key players, extends to 2032 and is valuable for long-term investment strategies.

Final Remarks  

A group of friends from “Organizational DNA Labs” (a private group) compiled references and notes from various theses, authors, media, and academics for this article and analysis. We also utilized AI platforms such as Gemini, Storm, Grok, Open-Source ChatGPT, and Grammarly as research assistants to save time and ensure our expressions’ structural and logical coherence. Using these platforms, we aim to verify information from multiple sources and validate it through academic databases and equity firm analysts with whom we have collaborated. The references and notes in this work provide a comprehensive list of our sources. As a researcher and editor, I have taken great care to ensure that all sources are correctly cited and that the authors receive recognition for their contributions. The content is primarily based on our compilation, analysis, and synthesis of these sources. The summaries and inferences reflect our dedication and motivation to expand and share knowledge. While we have drawn from high-quality sources to inform our perspective, the conclusion represents our views and understanding of the topics covered, which evolve through ongoing learning and literature reviews in this business field.