Security Classification Categories, Need to Know, and Clearances

Recently, it has been publicly revealed that a former president and the current president of the United States kept classified information outside established regulations. In the former's facilities, they found documents classified as TS//SI-G. In the latter, the classification category of the revealed documents still needs to be clarified. Therefore, without delving into the merits, it is necessary to describe the basic information structure of the classified material ecosystem, and the meaning of the letters indicated above as an example.

The security process and protocols for classified matters in the Department of Defense (DoD) can be described as a complex system (numerous components, sub-components, interconnections, interactions, or interdependence). It is intended to safeguard classified information and sensitive assets from unauthorized access or disclosure that could jeopardize national security.

The steps begin with proper information classification, which determines the level of security required to protect it (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential). Once classified, the information must be kept in a secure location, such as a classified document vault or a safe server room. Access to these facilities is strictly controlled, and individuals must have the appropriate security clearance and a need-to-know.

Classified information should also be transmitted securely using secure communication systems and methods. In addition to physical and technical security measures, the DoD also has a personnel security program in place to ensure that only individuals who are trustworthy and have a need-to-know have access to classified information. This includes background checks, security clearance investigations, and ongoing monitoring of individuals accessing classified information.

In the book: The Surprisingly Short History of American Secrecy, Sam Lebovic asserts, "The modern classification system was created in September 1951, in an executive order issued by Harry Truman. That order established the categories (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential) that are still used to keep information secret, as well as the rules and practices for classifying and securing information. Before this, the American government did not protect secrets in anything like the present form; secrecy had a different institutional character."

When delving into the classification system, the need-to-know concept is essential in projects or activities involving classified matters.  For example, "Executive Order #12968, "Need-to-know means a determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function." (Note: The most recent executive order is: Executive Order 13526- Classified National Security Information, signed by President Barack Obama).

The appointment of special prosecutors for the former and current president cases suggests that at least documents contained one of the three classification categories provided by Executive Order 13526 in force by President Obama.

The categories are:

1. Confidential/Restricted: information that, if leaked, could threaten national security. The bulk of information within this level involves the personal details of individual people.

1. Secret: information that, if leaked, could cause severe damage to national security as military maps, trade secrets, and information about covert informants or sources.

1. Top Secret: information that, if leaked, could cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Examples are military planning documents, maps of nuclear weapon storage sites, space-based systems, and communication intercepts.

• Acquisition SAPs: Programs that involve research, development, testing, modification, evaluation, or procurement of new technologies. (According to the Center for Development of Security Excellence, Acquisition SAPs make up 75-80% of all DoD SAPs) 

• Intelligence SAPs: Planning and execution of especially sensitive intelligence or counter-intelligence operations. 

• Operations and Support SAPs: Planning, implementation, and support of sensitive military activities. 

Adding to the complexity, aside from an objective category, all special access programs fall into one of two distinct protection levels—"acknowledged" or "unacknowledged."

It is needed to mention that according to Jeffrey Fields, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, many people with security clearances never handle classified material but need to be cleared so they can be present when classified information is discussed.

Furthermore, the security classification categories consist of two critical subsets for control of classified national military/intelligence products. These are:

Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI): This means a level of classification for information in such material concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes that require such information to be handled within formal access control systems (see below Special Access Programs) established by the Director of Central Intelligence (Cornell Law School 50 USC § 3345(f)(5). It is a compartmented, highly controlled system that is typically identified by a codeword, some of which have been declassified. It is estimated that between 100 and 300 classified information categories are grouped into two dozen control systems by compartments and sub-compartments. For example, BYEMAN, TALENT KEYHOLE, Special Intelligence, and HUMINT Control System). Let's see an example:

A document with a classification line shown as TS//SI-G stands for Top Secret/Special Intelligence/GAMMA. These control subsystems denote that the document is a highly sensitive communication intercept (intercepting phone calls, for instance, and electronic intelligence using electronic sensors to capture information other than communications) derived from Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). Among the products that MASINT can provide are specific weapon system identifications, chemical compositions, material content, and a potential adversary's ability to employ these weapons. This subsystem category is a science-intensive discipline that needs people/scientists well-versed in the broad range of physical and electrical sciences. Such scientists not typically be professionally developed with the I.C. They must come from academia fresh with scientific knowledge from experimentation and research (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press & Staff Study Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives One Hundred Fourth Congress).

Special Access Programs (SAP): “A program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level” (DoDD 5205.07). From the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, SAPs were usually called "black programs." There are over 100 SAPs, with many having numerous compartments and sub-compartments grouped into three categories:

Acknowledged SAPs - Programs that's existence and purpose can be openly recognized. With Acknowledged SAPs, typically only essential details, such as technologies, materials, or techniques, are kept secret. Funding for Acknowledged SAPs is primarily unclassified and can be seen in the government's fiscal budget. 

Unacknowledged SAPs or “USAPs”: When an SAP is designated as "unacknowledged," not only is a program's purpose carefully guarded, USAPs mere existence may be denied to everyone but a spare few who aren't a part of the program. The funding for unacknowledged SAPs is classified or intentionally hidden within the Federal budget.

When information is deemed extremely sensitive, it is exempted by statute (10 USC 119e) from typical congressional notification requirements. In such cases, only eight senior members of the congressional defense committees may be advised of the program. (Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists)

Given these subsets of classified national information, a person could not access the SCI or SAP information sub-systems even with a Secret or Top-Secret clearance unless authorized for a specific program ("read into").

There is a lot of speculation about government or military programs under the SAP control program, and this is where “conspiracy theorists” base or “develop their stories." However, these classification control systems by compartments and sub-compartments are generally essential for research projects. Scientists and technicians need to know specific aspects or components of a technological design. Still, they don't have to know the scope of the entire project" (emphasis ours).

The General Accountability Office (GAO) indicates, for its classified reports, the following: "Classified products are distributed only to those with the appropriate security clearance and an official need-to-know. Controlled unclassified products are distributed only to recipients who have an official need to know. Products identified as such have product numbers that end in C (classified) or S.U. (controlled unclassified information)."

The revelation that Major General Leslie R. Groves kept classified information about the radioactive effects of the said device is an extreme example of how secrecy can sometimes affect defense actions or government policies or even deceit them. Groves directed the operation of the Manhattan Project, through whom the atomic bomb was developed. Consequently, many of those who worked on the project and senior government officials were unaware of the devastating effects of radiation before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. According to Sean Malloy, a history professor at the University of California, Merced, President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson were among those who were not previously informed of the lethal effects that the bomb would have on the inhabitants of said cities for a significant time after the initial impact.

In the book "Atomic Doctors: Conscience and Complicity at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age," James L. Nolan, Jr. provides details on the secrecy strategy on this matter and whose objective was to hide the impact of radiation on the population. He also exposes how Groves, to questions from congressmen and reporters, vehemently denies that the bomb had any radioactive effects that went beyond "day zero."

Finally, when someone identifies to you as having worked with classified information, keep these processes and protocols in mind before taking their statement for granted.